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Summary  
Central to the organization of behavior is the ability to predict the values of 
outcomes to guide choices. The accuracy of such predictions is honed by a 
teaching signal that indicates how incorrect a prediction was (‘reward 
prediction error’, RPE). In several reinforcement learning contexts such as 
Pavlovian conditioning and decisions guided by reward history, this RPE 
signal is provided by midbrain dopamine neurons. In many situations, 
however, the stimuli predictive of outcomes are perceptually ambiguous. 
Perceptual uncertainty is known to influences choices, but it has been unclear 
whether or how dopamine neurons factor it into their teaching signal. To cope 
with uncertainty, we extended a reinforcement learning model with a belief 
state about the perceptually ambiguous stimulus; this model generates an 
estimate of the probability of choice correctness, termed decision confidence. 
We show that dopamine responses in monkeys performing a perceptually 
ambiguous decision task comply with the model’s predictions. Consequently, 
dopamine responses did not simply reflect a stimulus’ average expected 
reward value, but were predictive of the trial-to-trial fluctuations in perceptual 
accuracy. These confidence-dependent dopamine responses emerged prior to 
monkeys’ choice initiation raising the possibility that dopamine impacts 
impeding decisions, in addition to encoding a post-decision teaching signal. 
Finally, by manipulating reward size, we found that dopamine neurons reflect 
both the upcoming reward size and the confidence in achieving it. Together, 
our results show that dopamine responses convey teaching signals that are 
also appropriate for perceptual decisions. 
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Introduction 
In the struggle of life animals survive by following a simple dictum: win big and win 
often [1]. Finding bigger wins (e.g. more food reward) and more likely wins is 
particularly challenging when these are not available in their nearby environment. In 
these situations a process of trial and error is required to selectively reinforce the 
most successful actions. Inspired by the study of animal behavior, a machine 
learning approach called reinforcement learning provides a rigorous framework to 
understand how to select winning behaviors. The key to reinforcement learning is 
adjusting the expected reward values associated with each behavior based on the 
outcomes of one’s actions. These adjustments to reward values are based on the 
discrepancy between the received and predicted value, referred to as the reward 
prediction error [2]. There is a great deal understood about the neural mechanisms 
underlying reinforcement learning and it is well established that midbrain dopamine 
neurons broadcast reward prediction error signals [3-6]. Here we address whether 
dopamine neurons provide appropriate prediction error signals when there is 
ambiguity in the cues that predict rewards. 
Computing reward prediction error, by definition, requires predicting the value of 
impending outcomes. Such value prediction relies on different sources of information 
and correspondingly distinct processes as dictated by the behavioral context. In one 
context, distinct, unambiguous cues that predict different reward outcomes are used 
to guide decisions. Because there is no uncertainty in identifying the cues, the 
accuracy of outcome predictions is limited instead by potentially complex, 
probabilistic reward payoff contingencies. Thus the expected value of each decision 
can be estimated based on the experienced outcomes associated with the cues. 
These estimates can be produced by classic reinforcement learning algorithms [2]. In 
the context of ambiguous stimuli requiring perceptual decisions, animals face an 
additional challenge, because reward history alone can only provide an inaccurate 
estimate of upcoming outcome value. Rather, estimating the value of the choice 
requires an evaluation of the immediate percept and the decision process to 
compute the probability that the choice will be correct [7-9]. Thus, reward history-
guided and perceptual decisions, despite having fundamental similarities, differ in the 
computations required for reward prediction and hence prediction error estimation.  
The phasic activity of dopamine neurons has been the subject of many studies, a 
few employing choice behaviors and many using simple Pavlovian conditioning tasks 
[10, 11]. The results of these studies can be chiefly summarized as showing that 
dopamine responses encode prediction error, consistent with the temporal difference 
reinforcement learning (TDRL) algorithm [3-6, 12-23]. In contrast to this large body of 
literature characterizing how reward history determines dopamine responses, 
dopamine neurons have been rarely studied in perceptual decision tasks [24, 25]. 
Observations from these studies revealed that dopamine neurons exhibit temporally-
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extended responses during the perceptual choice and that they can reflect subjective 
sensory experiences, rather than physical stimulus intensity [24, 25].  
To understand dopamine neuron responses in perceptual decision making, we 
constructed a reinforcement learning model that incorporated a belief state to infer 
the trial-by-trial probability of choice correctness, reflecting the confidence in the 
decision. We compared dopamine neuronal responses recorded during a visual 
decision task to predictions of our model. These analyses enable us to show that 
dopamine prediction errors can reflect decision confidence in addition to reward 
magnitude and these signals emerge even before the behavioral manifestation of 
choice.  
Results 
Previously, Nomoto and colleagues studied midbrain dopamine neurons in a 
perceptual decision task [24]. Here we reexamined these neuronal responses in an 
attempt to identify signatures of prediction errors based on the value of a perceptual 
decision that requires an on-line estimate of the probability of choice correctness. 
The behavioral task and monkeys’ performance have been described previously [24] 
and explained in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures. Briefly, two Japanese 
macaques performed a two-alternative forced-choice reaction time task (Figure 1A, 
see Figure S1A). In each trial, monkeys were presented with a random dot motion 
visual stimulus and were trained to move their gaze to one of two targets based on 
the direction of motion and receive juice reward for their correct choices. Choice 
difficulty was adjusted by varying the coherence of dots pseudo-randomly from trial 
to trial. Across blocks of varying lengths, one motion direction was associated with a 
large reward magnitude while the other one was associated with a small reward. 
Animals could categorize easy (high coherence) stimuli almost perfectly but were 
challenged with more difficult (low coherence) stimuli (Figure S1B). Moreover, due to 
the asymmetric reward schedule, when presented with low coherence stimuli, 
animals showed bias toward the direction associated with the larger reward (Figure 
S1B, C). 
A reinforcement learning model incorporating perceptual uncertainty 
To examine whether the activity of dopamine neurons reflect the value of a 
perceptual decision, we constructed a computational model (Figure 1A). A 
reinforcement model for our behavioral task needs to deal with the perceptual 
ambiguity inherent in the random dot stimulus as well as keep track of the history of 
rewards delivered after left and right choices. The phasic responses of dopamine 
neurons in tasks in which reward values are based on prior experience are well 
captured by a standard temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) model [3, 
26]. For tasks involving noisy sensory information, variants of the TDRL based on 
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) have been proposed [27-30]. 
POMDPs capture the intuitive notion that under perceptual uncertainty a decision 
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maker faces an additional obstacle beyond stimulus-reward association, the need to 
make an estimate of the true state of the environment based on the current 
perceptual experience. This estimate is referred to as the ‘belief state’ [29, 30], and 
can be used to infer the probability that the choice will turn out to be correct, i.e. 
decision confidence. POMDP-based TDRL incorporates this belief into the 
computation of state values from which a choice can be made and a prediction error 
can be generated.  
Having received a motion stimulus, 𝑠𝑚, the model represents a noisy estimate of it, 
sampled from a normal distribution with constant variance and mean given by the 
true stimulus, ?̂?𝑚~𝒩(𝑠𝑚, 𝜎
2). In a Bayesian framework, a subject’s belief about the 
stimulus is not limited to a single estimated value but comprises a belief distribution 
over all possible values of 𝑠𝑚, given by 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). Assuming that the subject’s prior is 
that stimuli are uniformly delivered, the belief state distribution will also be Gaussian 
with the same variance as the sensory noise distribution, and mean given by ?̂?𝑚, 
?̂?𝑚: 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚) = 𝒩(?̂?𝑚, 𝜎
2) (Figure 1A). The model also stores the values of taking a 
left (L) or right (R) action, given each possible state 𝑠𝑚 : 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅) , 
respectively. On each trial, the value of left and right choices are computed as the 
expected values of these Q-values, given the belief state ?̂?𝑚 = 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). That is:  
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿)  = 〈𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿)〉?̂?𝑚  and 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅)  =  〈𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅)〉?̂?𝑚 , where 〈. 〉𝑝  denotes the 
expectation operator. Thus Q-values integrate both past rewards as well as the 
currently computed belief. The choice is computed by comparing 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿)  and 
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅). When the rewards for correct choices are equal across sides, then the only 
factor contributing to the choice is the current sensory signal. However, when 
rewards are unequal then choices are biased toward the larger value side in 
proportion to their relative size. The reward expectation associated with the choice 
(i.e. decision value) is given by 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒). Upon receiving the outcome (small, 
large or no reward) the model computes the prediction error, 𝛿𝑚 , the difference 
between the received reward size and the decision value, which incorporates both 
past rewards and the subjective belief about the accuracy of the current choice. This 
prediction error is then used to update 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅), which are used to make 
decisions in subsequent trials. Therefore, by employing a belief state, the POMPD-
based TDRL model can represent the trial-by-trial probability that the choice will turn 
out to be correct. Therefore, our main model introduces a case in which reward 
predictions (and hence prediction errors) are computed based on the same state 
inference process used by the decision making system.  
The alternative model reflects a scenario in which dopamine neurons do not have 
access to perceptual uncertainty contributing to the current choice. Instead, 
dopamine neurons’ value predictions and prediction error computations are informed 
by an independent sensory stream (see Figure S2A and Experimental Procedures). 
By comparing these two models, we identified several distinct features of prediction 
error signals computed solely based on reward history from those that additionally 
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have access to the perceptual uncertainty underlying the choice process. 
We refer to the prediction errors of the first model as decision value prediction errors 
(DPE), because these incorporate information about the current decision process. 
This is in contrast to prediction errors produced by the alternative model, which we 
refer to as the Markov Decision Process MDP prediction error (MDP-PE) that does 
not have direct access to the sensory evidence underling choice computation.  
To test the novel features of prediction errors in our belief state-dependent TDRL 
model, we wanted to isolate the contribution of the belief computation by first 
considering only large-reward trials (i.e. trials in which the model chose the side with 
the large reward). Following training, the model with the belief state produces three 
task-related prediction error responses (Figure 1B, top panel). First, there is a 
prediction error evoked by the fixation cue, the earliest predictor of a potential 
reward. This signal is uniform across all trial types and is proportional to the average 
value of a trial. Second, the model generates another prediction error when the 
stimulus is presented. This signal encodes the difference between the value of the 
current decision and the average value of a trial (indicated by the fixation cue) and 
can thus take on positive or negatives values. Finally, the model generates a 
prediction error at the moment of feedback signaling the deviation between the 
actual and the predicted outcome, i.e. the decision value at the stimulus time. The 
alternative TDRL model also generates three task-related prediction errors (Figure 
1B, bottom panel). Similar to the TDRL model with the belief state, prediction errors 
evoked by the fixation cue are uniform across trials. However, the prediction errors to 
stimuli and feedback are different from those generated by the alternative model in 
several ways (Figure 1B, cf. Figure 1C-E with Figure 1F-H).  
First, prediction errors generated by TDRL model with the belief state are distinct for 
correct and error outcomes (Figure 1C, D). At the time of the stimulus and outcome, 
prediction errors of the model with belief state reflect both stimulus difficulty as well 
as the upcoming outcome, thus qualitatively differing from those generated by the 
alternative model, which only reflect stimulus difficulty (Figure 1F, G). Second, the 
magnitude of prediction error at the time of the stimulus is predictive of decision 
accuracy (Figure 1E and H, see Figure S2C); decisions in trials with high prediction 
errors have greater accuracy for the same stimulus difficulty (Figure 1E), in sharp 
contrast with the alternative model (Figure 1H).  
Next we sought to clarify the critical features of the belief-state model that lead to 
these distinct predictions. For optimal decision making, keeping track of the full belief 
distribution, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), is necessary in general [31]. However, in a two alternative 
choice task with binary feedback (reward or no reward), after a decision is made, the 
relevant features of belief state distribution can be summarized as a confidence 
statistic. Decision confidence, in a statistical sense, is defined as the probability that 
the chosen action turns out to be the correct action, given the sensory evidence. This 
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can be formalized as 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) , where percept, the internal 
representation of the stimulus, is specified by the belief state. In our model, this 
quantity can be determined by computing the probability that the correct action 
corresponding to different stimulus states is the same as the chosen action (see 
Experimental Procedure). When computed for different stimulus difficulties and 
plotted separately for correct and incorrect trials, the pattern of computed 
𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) closely resembled the prediction error pattern of our 
belief-based TDRL model (Figure 2A, cf. Figure 1C-D). This indicates that the 
prediction errors generated by the model with a belief state are mathematically 
equivalent to decision confidence. Note that keeping track of the entire belief 
distribution, while important for optimal behavior in non-stationary environments, is 
not necessary for our behavioral task. Because of the stationarity typical of 
laboratory decision tasks, a reduced version of our model that uses the mean of the 
belief state to assign a single state to the motion stimulus, without keeping track of 
the full distribution could also account for our data (see Figure S2B and Experimental 
Procedure). In summary, when the model incorporates information about the current 
decision process, after learning, it contains the knowledge about the relationship 
between quality of internal evidence and the expected outcome of the decision, in 
other words, decision confidence. 
The signature predictions of the TDRL model with the belief state (Figure 1C) can be 
intuitively understood using a signal detection theory inspired approach to decision 
confidence. Here, confidence reflects the distance between the internal 
representation of the stimulus (percept), and decision boundary, 𝑏, or more precisely 
confidence is a calibrated function of this distance, 𝑐 = 𝑓𝑐|𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 − 𝑏|, as shown 
previously [32]. Figure 2B illustrates how the stimulus and boundary configurations 
that could lead to a given choice offer an intuition behind model predictions. For 
correct choices, distance between stimulus distribution and the boundary increases 
as the stimulus becomes easier. For error choices, which happen when a stimulus is 
perceived to be on the wrong side of the boundary, the distance between stimulus 
sample and boundary tends to be smaller for easy stimuli because the overlapping 
region of the stimulus distribution is smaller. Thus, although errors are less frequent 
for easy stimuli, when they occur, the distance from the stimulus sample to the 
boundary is small, and hence confidence is low. 
Responses of dopamine neurons reflect decision confidence 
Next we analyzed the activity of 75 dopamine neurons recorded while monkeys 
performed the perceptual decision task (Supplemental Experimental Procedures) 
[24]. We first limited our analysis to trials in which animals chose the large-reward 
side, which enabled us to isolate the contribution of the perceptual decision process 
independent of reward size. The responses of these neurons closely matched the 
prediction errors produced by our model with a belief state. Figure 3A and B show 
responses of an example dopamine neuron and neuronal population aligned to the 
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stimulus and feedback tone (see Figure S3A-C for responses to the fixation cue), 
and separated based on the trial outcome. After stimulus onset, the early responses 
(until ~200 ms) were uniform, and only later components (~200-500ms) reflected 
stimulus coherence [24]. These later responses increased with stimulus coherence 
for correct choices (Linear regression on single neurons, 67/75 positive and 5/75 
negative slope, P < 0.01, 3/75 not significant) and decreased for error choices 
(Linear regression on single neurons: 33/75 with negative and 5/75 positive slope, P 
< 0.01, 37/75 not significant), consistent with the DPEs of the model with belief state 
(cf. Figure 1C with Figure 3C and D). Note that analyzing dopamine responses using 
a longer temporal window (60-600 ms after the stimulus onset) displayed very similar 
response patterns (Figure S3D). Responses to the feedback tone also showed 
graded sensitivity to both the stimulus coherence and the animal’s choice similar to 
the DPE signals (cf. Figure 1D with Figure 3C and D; Linear regression on single 
neurons for correct trials: 53/75 with positive, 8/75 with negative slope, P < 0.01, 
14/75 not significant; Linear regression on single neurons for error trials: 27/75 with 
negative, 14/75 with positive slope, P < 0.01, 34/75 not significant). To further 
quantify when this choice outcome-selectivity (difference between correct and error 
trials) arose in individual neurons, we used receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis and computed area under ROC curve (AUC) in sliding time windows 
(Experimental Procedures). Figure 3B shows that the majority of neurons showed 
outcome-selective responses to the stimulus and feedback (61/75 and 66/75 
neurons, for responses to the stimulus and feedback tone, respectively, permutation 
test on sliding ROCs, P < 0.001). These results suggest that during perceptual 
decisions, dopamine responses do not simply reflect the average value of the 
perceptually ambiguous stimulus but are also predictive of the trial-to-trial 
fluctuations in decision outcome.  
Confidence-dependent dopamine responses arise prior to observed choice 
We next considered the time course of choice outcome-selectivity in relation to 
saccade initiation, which is the earliest observable measure of choice commitment 
(Figure 4A and B). We found that the difference in dopamine responses between 
correct and error choices emerged considerably before action initiation (Figure 4A, 
Mann-Whitney U test on responses during 300 ms before saccade onset: 33/75 
neurons with larger pre-saccadic activity for correct compared to error trials, P < 
0.05; sliding ROC analysis with permutation test: 45/75 neurons extending up to 300 
ms before the saccade onset, P < 0.001). Thus, outcome-selective dopamine 
responses begin even before the behavioral manifestation of choice commitment. 
Our model further predicts that dopamine signals should be predictive of choice 
accuracy (Figure 1E and H, see Figure S2C). We found that the graded levels of pre-
choice dopamine responses (during the 300 ms before saccade onset) predicted the 
accuracy of monkeys (Figure 4C, Linear regression on single neurons: 58/75 with 
positive and 1/75 with negative slope, P < 0.01, 16/75 not significant). Moreover, this 
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predictive property of responses should go beyond what can be inferred from 
stimulus difficulty alone, such that trials with larger prediction errors should have 
increased accuracy for the same stimulus difficulty (Figure 1E). To test this, we 
separated trials based on the rate of the pre-choice dopamine activity (below versus 
above 75 percentile) and found that monkeys’ psychometric slopes were significantly 
greater when dopamine activity was high (Figure 4D, Mann-Whitney U test on 
session-by-session slopes of the psychometric functions: Monkey L: p = 1.99 X 10-6, 
Monkey K: p = 0.002; Mann-Whitney U test on individual data points, p < 0.05 in both 
monkeys). We next considered the possibility that this difference in performance is 
due to different durations of sensory evidence integration. There was no difference in 
reaction times for a given stimulus difficulty for high and low pre-choice dopamine 
activity (Figure S4A, p > 0.1; Mann-Whitney U test) and the difference in 
psychometric slopes (Figure 4D) held even when we only considered high or low 
reaction times (median split, p < 0.01 in both monkeys). These analyses exclude the 
possibility that dopamine firing simply indexes reaction times and thus the accuracy 
differences observed are a direct consequence of differential sensory evidence 
integration. In contrast to this choice-predictive phasic dopamine activity, separating 
trials based on the pre-stimulus tonic activity or phasic activity to the fixation cue did 
not reveal correlations with perceptual accuracy (P > 0.1 in both monkeys, Mann-
Whitney U test, Figure S4B-C). Theoretical accounts as well as pharmacological 
studies in humans suggested that the tonic levels of dopamine correlate with factors 
such as average reward rate that reflect response vigor ([33, 34], but see [35] for 
pre-trial dopamine action potentials). In our data the tonic firing of dopamine neurons 
before trial initiation does not correlate with decision accuracy. 
Dopamine responses integrate decision confidence and reward size  
Until now, we focused on the large-reward side trials to isolate the contribution of the 
perceptual decision process to prediction error signals. Next, we investigated how 
the neuronal representation of decision confidence interacts with reward size. 
Therefore, we evaluated our model predictions after including both small- and large-
reward trials (Experimental Procedures), and similarly, examined neuronal 
responses in all trials irrespective of the reward size. DPEs computed by the TDRL 
model with the belief state jointly reflected confidence estimates and expected 
reward size (Figure 5A). When rewards associated with left and right choices differ, 
𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅) are updated to reflect these rewards whereas the belief state, 
𝑝(?̂?𝑚|𝑠𝑚), continues to reflect the trial-by-trial probability that sensory categorization 
will turn out to be correct. Because decision value represents the product of these 
variables, it jointly reflects reward size as well as the confidence in obtaining it. 
Therefore, DPEs should reflect both reward and confidence predictions. To test this 
directly we asked whether the population of dopamine neurons that showed 
confidence-dependent responses (61/75 neurons quantified with the sliding ROC 
analysis, Figure 3B), do so mainly irrespective of the expected reward size. We 
separated dopamine responses to the stimulus and feedback tone based on the 
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saccade direction (i.e. towards the side associated with small or large reward) and 
trial outcome (error or correct). The population neuronal responses were modulated 
by both decision confidence and reward size, resembling the DPE predictions (cf. 
Figure 5A and B) and showed marked differences from the prediction of a 
conventional TDRL model (Figure S5).  
Next we sought to isolate the effect of decision confidence on dopamine responses 
irrespective of reward size. Therefore, we quantified the differences in responses 
between correct and errors trials by computing the area under the ROC curve (AUC). 
Confidence encoding predicts that the difference between cue-driven correct and 
error response increases with increasing stimulus coherence (Figure 5A), and hence 
the AUC measure should capture this trend [32]. Indeed, at the time of stimulus, 
AUC measures for both small and large reward conditions showed a significant 
positive relation with stimulus coherence (Figure 5C; linear regression of population 
AUC onto stimulus coherence: P < 0.001 for both small and large reward conditions). 
Similarly, at the time of feedback, AUCs for both reward conditions showed a 
significant inverse relation with stimulus coherence (Linear regression of population 
AUC onto stimulus coherence: P < 0.001 for both small and large reward conditions). 
Thus, for both small and large reward conditions, dopamine responses showed 
stronger outcome sensitivity (larger AUC) as stimulus coherence increased.  
Finally, we examined the extent to which stimulus-driven responses reflected both 
decision confidence and reward size for each neuron. To quantify confidence and 
reward encoding independently, we compared the difference between responses for 
correct vs. error trials and for large vs. small reward trials using ROC analysis 
(Figure 5D, left panels). The majority of neurons encoded both decision confidence 
as well as upcoming reward size with similar strength (Figure 5D, right panel, ROC 
analysis with permutation test in 39/75 neurons, P < 0.01), while a fraction of 
neurons reflected only one variable reliably (9/75 outcome selective only, 22/75 
reward size selective only, ROC analysis with permutation test, P < 0.01; for the 
sake of comparison a fixed time window, 220-500 ms, was used after the stimulus 
although the time course of encoding across neurons is variable, Figure 3B, 4B). 
Interestingly, neurons which only showed outcome selectively (9/75 neurons) did so 
while monkeys showed clear behavioral sensitivity to reward size manipulation in 
these sessions (P < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U test on estimated psychometric bias). 
Together, these analyses indicate that dopamine neurons compute prediction errors 
by taking into account both the expected reward size as well as the subjective belief 
about the correctness of a perceptual choice. 
Discussion 
Taken together our analyses reveal a close correspondence between the phasic 
activity of dopamine neurons during a perceptual decision task and a reinforcement 
learning model extended with a belief state. In Bayesian decision theory belief states 
serve as estimates of the uncertain true states [29]. Specifically, in our model the 
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role of the belief state is to represent the uncertainty arising from a perceptually 
ambiguous stimulus and enables a prediction about the probability that the stimulus 
categorization will be correct. In our decision task, this state inference process is 
equivalent to a computation of statistical decision confidence [9], as our analyses 
revealed (Figure 2a). In fact, the distinctive signatures of our belief-state-dependent 
TDRL model (Figure 1C-E, see Figure S2C), that are qualitatively different from a 
TDRL without belief-state (Figure 1F-H), are precisely those that have been used to 
identify decision confidence in the orbitofrontal and pulvinar neuronal responses as 
well as rodent and human confidence-reporting behavior [8, 32, 36, 37]. These 
similarities support the hypothesis that dopamine prediction error signals incorporate 
estimates of decision confidence during perceptual decision making. We emphasize 
that in our task monkeys were not trained to report their decision confidence, thus 
our results do not imply a neuronal correlate of confidence reporting behavior but 
rather reveal the neuronal representation of a signal that is consistent with the 
computation of decision confidence. In other words, we use the term confidence in a 
statistical sense, i.e. the probability that a choice is correct given the evidence [9, 
31], and show that an RL model that reflects this computation accounts for dopamine 
responses under perceptual uncertainty.  
Dopaminergic integration of decision confidence and reward value signals 
Our perceptual decision task with an asymmetric reward schedule allowed us to 
dissociate two information sources for computing expected rewards and prediction 
errors: trial-by-trial estimates of reward probability and the history-dependent 
estimates of reward size. Thus, while our findings are fully consistent with the notion 
that dopamine responses reflect reward expectation, they reveal how reward 
expectations are formed based on uncertain sensory evidence. From this standpoint, 
our results agree with previous findings that dopamine responses integrate across all 
relevant reward dimensions to encode the subjective expected value of future 
rewards [21].  
A previous study, using a vibrotactile detection task, showed that dopamine 
responses can vary with perceptual reports rather than stimulus physical parameters 
[25]. Dopamine responses for correct detection trials increased with stimulus 
intensity but not for missed stimuli, suggesting that perceptual uncertainty might 
influence dopamine response. However, that study did not test the relationship 
between choice accuracy and dopamine activity, thus the relationship of those data 
to prediction errors requiring belief state computation remain unclear. In addition, in 
that study choice reports were delayed, unlike in our reaction time task that enabled 
us to observe pre-choice responses that were predictive of performance. Thus, 
without taking a computational approach, it remained unclear what type of 
computations might underlie those observations and also how they could be related 
to dopamine prediction error responses observed in reward history-guided tasks. 
The asymmetric reward schedule in the task allowed us to examine dopamine 
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responses in relation to the computations underlying confidence and demonstrate 
that dopamine neurons perform confidence estimation simultaneously with reward 
size-dependent prediction error signaling. We suggest that dopamine responses in 
the vibrotactile detection task [25] can also be explained by our computational 
framework incorporating belief states, given that correct detection responses 
increase with increasing confidence in the sensory percept [38].   
In another related study, Matsumoto and Takada [39] explored dopamine neuronal 
responses in a delayed match-to-sample visual search task and suggested that they 
reflected the monkey’s subjective judgment of success. Examining these neuronal 
responses in light of a model that estimates confidence in visual search success 
might reveal signatures of confidence coding in that study as well. 
A unified framework for understanding dopamine in perceptual and reward 
history-guided tasks 
From a computational perspective, it is straightforward to see that computing 
decision confidence is necessary for estimating the trial-by-trial value of a perceptual 
decision, which can be combined with reinforcement-based expected reward value 
for computing prediction errors. Therefore, our results are a natural extension of the 
well-established framework according to which dopamine neurons carry reward 
prediction signals. Reward prediction errors have been mostly studied in reward 
history-guided tasks where past outcomes are sufficient to compute the value of 
upcoming reward [3-6, 12, 14-16, 18-22]. Our findings thus provide an instance of a 
computational framework in which both reward history-guided and perceptual 
choices can be studied. Consistent with predictions of this framework, dopamine 
prediction errors reflected both past rewards as well as immediate belief about the 
outcome of sensory categorization, supporting the view that these neurons access a 
wider range of computations than previously thought [15, 16, 39, 40]. From this 
perspective, these results can serve as a bridge between reward history-guided and 
perceptually-guided decision making, which while both integral components of 
decisions in natural settings, have been mostly studied in isolation (but see [41-44]). 
We note that explaining our neuronal responses does not require incorporating an 
explicit confidence variable into the RL framework. RL models without any explicit 
confidence computation, such as our POMDP model implementations, could account 
for the observed neuronal responses, as long as prediction errors are computed in 
relation to value predictions that are based on the sensory evidence used for the 
choice computation. While such models do not incorporate any explicit confidence 
variable, their prediction errors reflect the 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡), i.e. decision 
confidence, as our simulation indicated (Figure 2A, see Experimental Procedure). 
Another related issue is that, while keeping track of the full belief state is necessary 
for efficient choice computation and updating in a non-stationary environment, 
keeping track of the first moment of the belief state is sufficient for explaining our 
neuronal data (Figure S2B). Nevertheless, we favor the POMDP model that includes 
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a full belief state for several reasons. Optimal processing in the face of perceptual 
uncertainty requires that sensory stimuli should be probabilistically represented. By 
representing the stimulus as a distribution, POMDPs offer the normative framework 
to cope with such uncertainty. This comes at the cost of only one additional variable, 
the belief state, but no additional parameters. As a consequence, this framework can 
be broadly applied. For instance, beliefs might have a non-Gaussian distribution, 
when Bayesian inference is used and the belief state is influenced by not only the 
external stimulus, but also by the statistics of the environment as reflected the 
Bayesian prior. 
A previous modeling study suggested a neuronal network implementation of POMDP 
framework, focusing primarily on the computational reasons behind the extended 
time course of dopamine, as well as prediction errors in perceptual decision tasks of 
the type described here [30]. The model we developed is based on fundamentally 
similar ideas from machine learning for introducing perceptual ambiguity into the RL 
framework. Our approach was to generate several diagnostic predictions of the 
model, those that contrast it with a TDRL without a belief state, and test them against 
the activity of dopamine neurons. This approach enabled us to demonstrate that the 
main computational requirement necessary to account for dopamine responses 
under perceptual uncertainty is decision confidence. Statistical confidence explains 
the relation between the dopamine prediction errors, stimulus coherence and 
animal’s choice (Figure 3). This analysis also provides evidence against the 
interpretation that the difference in dopamine activity in correct/error trials reflects an 
attentional process, rather than decision confidence, because trials with different 
dopamine responses lead to different slopes of the psychometric function but 
comparable lapse rates (Figure 4). Finally, our model identifies the contribution of 
both reward size and confidence in shaping dopamine responses (Figure 5). As 
mentioned, the diagnostic predictions of our model do not depend on the specific 
way confidence is computed: confidence estimates based on the belief state of a 
POMDP or explicit confidence signals generated using frameworks such as evidence 
accumulation [7] or attractor models [45], when incorporated into a RL model, would 
yield similar predictions (Figure 2). Confidence models based on evidence 
accumulation have proven useful for explaining how neuronal responses in parietal 
cortex evolve over time to represent decision confidence [7]. In our implementation, 
we assumed that confidence estimation occurs as a discrete processing step, which 
appears consistent with the transient nature of dopamine responses observed here. 
Nevertheless it will be interesting to evaluate models where confidence estimation 
unfolds across time [7]. 
Implications for decision making 
It is generally believed that dopamine neurons do not have a direct role in computing 
immediate decisions [14]. Rather, decisions are generated elsewhere in the brain 
and conveyed to the dopamine system, where a prediction error is computed in 
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relation to an already prepared or completed choice, which helps guide future 
choices. The fact that dopamine responses reflect both reward size and subjective 
belief in receiving the reward suggest that they can act as a teaching signal for a 
both reward history-guided and perceptual decisions[46]. Moreover, dopamine 
responses begin to predict the decision outcome rapidly (~200 ms) after the stimulus 
onset, and well before (~200 ms) the earliest behavioral manifestation of choice 
commitment (i.e. saccade initiation). This time course is comparable to choice and 
confidence-dependent activity that appears around 200-300 ms after stimulus onset 
during random dots task in monkeys’ parietal cortex and dorsal pulvinar [7, 36], 
suggesting that the observed dopamine signals might be received from other brain 
regions involved in the perceptual choice process such as the caudate nucleus [47]. 
This time course suggests that prediction error signals reflect the evolving decision 
process. Given the dense dopaminergic projections to brain regions involved in 
decision making [48], the early dopamine prediction errors might even be able to 
influence the current choice computation, for instance by modulating the gain of 
evidence accumulation [49]. Alternatively, pre-decision dopamine responses do not 
impact choices directly but other aspects of immediate behavior such as the 
willingness to complete the trial [50]. In conclusion, our results formally extend the 
prediction error coding framework of dopamine neurons into the perceptual decision 
making domain and suggest that dopamine broadcasts prior to choice commitment 
may influence the on-going decision process. 
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Experimental Procedures 
Animal care and surgical procedures were in accordance with the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and with 
Tamagawa University guidelines for the use and care of laboratory animals in 
research. 
Temporal difference reinforcement learning models 
We used two variants of the temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) 
model to simulate dopamine neuronal activity: a TDRL model incorporating a belief 
state that deals with the uncertainty it faces when performing the perceptual decision 
making and a TDRL model that did not have access to this belief state (‘alternative 
TDRL’). The basic features of the model implementation that were common among 
the model variants are described in the Supplemental Experimental Procedure.  
We simulated the sequence of behavioral events in each trial as states, 𝑠. For our 
task, these states are ‘initial, ‘fixation cue’, ‘motion stimulus’, ‘feedback and ‘end’, 
denoted as 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑓𝑐 , 𝑠𝑚 , 𝑠𝑓𝑏 , 𝑠𝑒 .  In each state, the agent performs an action, 𝑎 , 
observes an outcome and transits to the next state. 
TDRL model with the belief state 
Here we use a partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) formalism 
to deal with the uncertainty inherent in the random dot stimulus. Apart from ‘motion 
stimulus’ state, all other states are defined as fully observable and thus the same as 
in the previous section.  
For the case of ‘motion stimulus’ state, due to the noisy nature of the stimulus, the 
agent has an imperfect knowledge about the true underlying state and represents it 
in a probabilistic manner. Motion stimuli ranged from -50% to 50% (50% of dots 
moving to left and right, respectively). We used a discrete form of these stimuli (21 
different levels of motion coherence), i.e. -50%, -45% …, 0, …, 45%, 50%, 
corresponding to motion stimulus states 𝑠𝑚. We assume that due to the uncertainty 
inherent in the random dot stimulus, in each trial, subject does not directly observe 
𝑠𝑚 but an internal noisy estimate of it which, in each trial, is sampled from a normal 
distribution with constant variance 𝜎2 around the true stimulus; that is ?̂?𝑚~𝒩(𝑠𝑚, 𝜎
2). 
A subject’s belief about the stimulus comprises a belief distribution over all possible 
values of 𝑠𝑚; this distribution can be denoted by 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). In our implementation, we 
discretized this belief distribution ?̂?𝑚: 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚) = 𝒩(?̂?𝑚, 𝜎
2)  and truncated it to 
values between – 50% and 50%. 
The Q-values of actions left and right for each state 𝑠𝑚 are denoted as 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and 
𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅), respectively. For each motion coherence state ranging from -50% to 50%, 
the model learns and updates the Q-values of choosing left or right.  
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Under this setting, given a belief 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), the net value of actions L and R are 
computable as the expected values of 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and  𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅)  under the belief 
state,  ?̂?𝑚: 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚): 
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿) = 〈𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿)〉?̂?𝑚 = ∑ 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿)
𝑠𝑚∈{−50%,..,50%}
 
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅) = 〈𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅)〉?̂?𝑚 = ∑ 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅)
𝑠𝑚∈{−50%,..,50%}
 
                  Eq. 1  
For action selection, we assume that the animal just chooses the action that has the 
highest value. That is 𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐴). 
Upon observing the stimulus and selecting a choice, the prediction error is computed 
as: 
𝛿𝑚 = 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑎) − 𝑉𝑓𝑐                                                                           Eq. 2 
where 𝑉𝑓𝑐 is the expected value of reward during fixation cue presentation: 
𝑉𝑓𝑐 =
𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿) + 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅)
2
 
                             Eq. 3 
When the agent occupies the fixation cue state, the belief 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚) is a uniform 
distribution. 
After performing action 𝑎 and receiving the reward feedback 𝑅, the prediction error is 
𝛿𝑓𝑏 = 𝑅 − 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑎)                                              Eq. 4 
Based on this prediction error the Q-value of action 𝑎 will be updated as: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑎) ← 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑎) + 𝛼. 𝛿𝑓𝑏 . 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), ∀𝑠𝑚 ∈ {−0.50%, . . ,0.50%};                Eq. 5                                                                                        
where 𝛼 is the learning rate.  
Following learning, the prediction errors at different states of the task exhibit the 
patterns plotted in Figure 1B-E. 
 
Model prediction errors and decision confidence 
We now show by simulation that, in the context of our task, the probability that the 
choice turns out to be correct given the sensory evidence, i.e. the decision 
confidence, is qualitatively equivalent to prediction error at the motion stimulus state, 
𝛿𝑚.  
In order to compute decision confidence, 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑎, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡), we first compute, for 
each possible motion coherence, 𝑠𝑚, whether the choice 𝑎 that was made on the 
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basis of 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚) is the same as the choice that would have been made on the basis 
of 𝑠𝑚. In other words, if the choice that would have been made on the basis of 𝑠𝑚 
(i.e., by comparing 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅)  and 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) ) was the same as 𝑎 , that choice is 
considered correct, and otherwise incorrect: 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), 𝑠𝑚) = {
1
𝑖𝑓 [ 𝑎 = 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅) > 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) ]
𝑜𝑟 [ 𝑎 = 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅) < 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) ]
0 𝑜. 𝑤.
                    Eq. 6 
Having defined choice correctness for each possible 𝑠𝑚, we define confidence as the 
expected value of choice correctness, under the belief distribution  ?̂?𝑚: 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚): 
𝑝 (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑎, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚)) = 〈𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), 𝑠𝑚)〉?̂?𝑚                                     Eq. 7 
where 〈. 〉𝑝 is the expectation operator under the distribution p. In other words: 
𝑝 (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑎, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚)) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚). 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚), 𝑠𝑚)
𝑠𝑚∈{−50%,..,50%}
 
                  Eq. 8 
Simulation of this equation indicates that, in our TDRL model with the belief state 
prediction errors reflect the probability that the choice will turn out to be correct, and 
thus implicitly reflect decision confidence (Figure 2A). 
Note that tracking the full belief distribution, as normatively prescribed for efficient 
choice in more complex tasks requiring Bayesian updating, is not essential for our 
behavioral task. A reduced version of our POMDP model that uses the mean of the 
belief state to assign a single state, ?̂?𝑚, to the motion stimulus and arrive at a choice 
by comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿)  and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅)  (𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴) ) results in prediction error 
patterns similar to those of our full POMDP model (see Figure S2B).  
To isolate the effect of decision confidence on model prediction errors, in Figure 1, 
we illustrate predictions of the model only in trials for which the agent choses the 
large reward side. To investigate the effect of decision confidence and reward size, 
in Figure 5, we illustrate the predictions of the model in all trials, independent of the 
reward size. 
 
The alternative model 
The alternative model introduces a case in which the dopamine system does not 
have direct access to the sensory evidence used for the decision process. In this 
model, the decision making system assign one state, ?̂?𝑚, to the motion stimulus and 
makes the choice by comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅) (𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴)). Since the 
dopamine system does not have direct access to the sensory evidence used for 
choice, it assigns another state, ?̂?𝑚′ , to the motion stimulus, which could be identical 
to different from the one used for choice, ?̂?𝑚. The dopamine system uses the largest 
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of 𝑄(?̂?𝑚′, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚′, 𝑅) for prediction error computation at the motion stimulus and 
feedback states (Figure S2A). As such, in this model, the state inference and choice 
computation are identical to the reduced POMDP (Figure S2B) but the model reflects 
the situation that the dopamine system does not have access to the sensory 
evidence used for choice. 
Figure 1, illustrates predictions of the alternative model only in large-reward trials 
and Figure S5 illustrates the predictions of the model in all trials, independent of the 
reward size. 
 
Analysis of the neuronal data 
We analyzed only the trials in which the monkey made directional choices and thus 
we excluded trials in which the monkey broke fixation before the onset of the random 
dot motion stimuli. For analyses shown in Figure 3 and 4, we only included trials in 
which animals made a saccade towards large-reward side. This enabled us to isolate 
the neuronal representation of decision confidence independent of reward size. For 
analysis shown in Figure 5, we included all trials regardless of saccade direction, 
which allowed us to examine the effect of decision confidence and reward size on 
dopamine neuronal responses. Because testing predictions of our model requires 
both correct and error trials, in all our analysis, we included both types of trials.  
All data analyses and modeling were performed using custom-made software coded 
with Matlab (MathWorks). Supplemental Experimental Procedure includes details of 
statistical analyses on neuronal responses. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Predictions of a temporal difference learning model that incorporates 
a belief state 
(A) Schematic of a TDRL model incorporating a belief state for performing the 
random dot motion discrimination task (see Experimental Procedures and Figure 
S1). Having observed a noisy readout of the motion stimulus ?̂?𝑚, the model forms a 
belief, denoted by ?̂?𝑚: 𝑝(𝑠𝑚|?̂?𝑚) , representing the probability distribution over all 
motion stimulus states, 𝑠𝑚 (red bars, for simplicity only six states are shown in the 
panel). The model also stores the values of taking a left or right action, given each 
possible state 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅), respectively. On each trial, the value of left and 
right decisions are computed: 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿)  = 〈𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿)〉?̂?𝑚 and 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅)  =  〈𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅)〉?̂?𝑚 . 
The choice is made by comparing 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝐿)  and 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑅) . The reward expectation 
associated with the choice (i.e. decision value) is 𝑄?̂?𝑚(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒). Upon receiving the 
outcome (small, large or no reward) the model computes the prediction error, 𝛿𝑚, the 
difference between the received reward size and the decision value. This prediction 
error, together with the belief state, is then used to update 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(𝑠𝑚, 𝑅), 
which are used in the subsequent trials. 
(B) Schematic of prediction error function of the TDRL model with belief state (top) 
and the alternative TDRL model (bottom), as a function of stimulus difficulty and 
decision outcomes (i.e. correct or error). DPE refers to decision value prediction 
errors for the model with a belief state, while MDP-PE stands for Markov Decision 
Process prediction error of the model without belief state. Unlike the model without 
the belief state, prediction errors at the time of stimulus in the model with the belief 
state reflect the decision outcome. Note that since some stimuli predict below 
average reward rates, the resulting prediction errors at the motion stimulus state can 
be negative.  
(C-E) Properties of the TDRL model with belief state. The plots are from a model run 
with asymmetric reward sizes and in order to isolate the effect of belief on the model 
behavior, only trials with a choice toward the large-reward side are shown. Note that 
decision values depend on both belief and the reward size, hence for large-reward 
choices, DPEs take on slight positive values even for stimuli with close to zero 
coherence. See Figure S2 for additional predictions of this model. 
(C) DPEs at the time of stimulus show dependency on both stimulus coherence and 
decision outcome. These prediction errors reflect subjective belief about the choice 
correctness.  
(D) Model’s DPEs at the time of the outcome feedback. These prediction errors 
reflect the difference between the value of obtained reward and the values predicted 
at stimulus time, shown in (C). 
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(E) The model’s psychometric curves plotted separately for high and low DPEs at the 
time of stimulus (above and below 75th percentile, respectively). Trials with larger 
DPEs for the same stimulus coherence predict increased choice accuracy. 
(F-H) as in (C-E) for a TDRL model without belief state. Note that both TDRL model 
with belief state and the alternative TDRL model have qualitatively similar predictions 
when only correct trials are taken into account. Thus, for comparing the two models, 
it is essential to include both correct and error trials. See Figure S2 for schematic of 
this model. See also Figures S1 and S2. 
 
Figure 2. Prediction errors of the TDRL model with belief state reflect decision 
confidence  
(A) The pattern of estimated decision confidence. The simulation 
of 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 | 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡)  in this model shown as a function of stimulus 
coherence separately for correct and error choices (see Experimental Procedure). 
Note the similarity of these patterns with prediction errors in the belief-state TDRL 
model (cf. the panel with Figure 1C). 
 (B) Signal detection theory-inspired intuition illustrating the model’s predictions. For 
the same external stimulus, the distance between a percept s and the decision 
boundary b differs across trials (compare s1 and s2 for the difficult stimulus example 
and s3 and s4 for the easy stimulus example) leading to different confidence 
estimates (distance between the percept s, and the boundary b), as shown in the 
middle panel. 
 
Figure 3. Dopamine responses reflect both stimulus difficulty and choice 
(A) Top panels: Raster plots of an example dopamine neuron aligned to stimulus 
onset and feedback tone onset, which indicated the trial outcome (correct or error). 
For error trials of low stimulus coherence and all correct trials, only a fraction of trials 
(randomly selected) is shown. Bottom panels: pre-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) 
of the example neuron aligned to different task events. In the PSTHs, trials with 
different stimulus difficulties were collapsed. Horizontal gray bars indicate temporal 
windows used for analyses in (C). For illustration purposes, in all figures, we treat 
stimuli of equal coherence together, regardless of motion direction. To isolate the 
effect of decision confidence on neuronal responses, only trials in which the monkey 
made a saccade to the large-reward side were included in all panels of this figure. 
See Figure S3 for neuronal responses to the fixation cue. Unless otherwise stated, in 
all figures error bars are s.e.m. across trials or neurons (for single neuron examples 
and population, respectively). 
(B) Top panels: PSTHs of dopamine population (averaged across 75 neurons 
recorded in two monkeys) aligned to different task events. Trials with different 
stimulus difficulties were collapsed. Horizontal gray bars indicate temporal windows 
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used for analyses in (D). Bottom panels: Running area under ROC curve (AUC) for 
each neuron aligned to different events (see Experimental Procedures). The AUCs 
significantly larger than 0.5 indicate larger dopamine responses in correct trial 
compared to the error trials. For illustration, AUCs in each panel are sorted based on 
the time of the first of three consecutive significant analysis time steps (P < 0.001).  
(C) The average responses of the example dopamine neuron at the time of stimulus 
and feedback tone. These neuronal responses resembled the DPE of the TDRL 
model shown in Figure 1C and D.  
(D) The population dopamine responses at the time of stimulus and feedback tone. 
These neuronal responses resembled the DPE of the TDRL model shown in Figure 
1c and d and differed markedly from prediction errors of the alternative TDRL model 
shown in Figure 1F and G. See also Figure S3. 
 
Figure 4. Dopamine activity predicts choice accuracy prior to behavioral 
response 
(A) PSTH of an example neuron and the entire neuronal population aligned to 
saccade onset (i.e. the time in which the animal gaze left the central fixation). In the 
PSTHs, trials with different stimulus difficulties were collapsed. Horizontal gray bars 
indicate temporal windows used for analyses in B-D. Only choices towards the large-
reward size were included in all panels of this figure. 
(B) Left: Area under ROC curve (AUC) for the example neuron measured from pre-
saccade dopamine responses (during 250 ms prior to saccade initiation). At each 
stimulus coherence neuronal responses in correct and error trials were used to 
compute AUC. Right:  running AUC for all neurons aligned to the saccade onset. For 
this analysis, trials from all tested coherence levels were collapsed and running AUC 
for each neuron was measured by comparing neuronal responses in each time bin of 
correct and error trials.  
(C) Choice accuracy as a function of dopamine pre-saccade responses (measured 
for each neuron from responses during 300 ms before saccade initiation).  
(D) Animals’ psychometric curves separated based on the pre-saccade dopamine 
responses (below and above 75th percentile, respectively). See also Figure S4. 
 
Figure 5. Dopamine responses reflect both decision confidence and reward 
size. 
(A) Prediction errors of a TDRL model with belief state trained on an asymmetric 
reward schedule. Unlike Figure 1C-D, here all trials irrespective of reward size were 
included. See Figure S5 for analogous plots from a TDRL model that does not 
include a belief-state. 
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(B) Population dopamine responses at the time of stimulus and feedback tone 
separated based on the reward size condition (small/large reward) as well as 
decision outcome (error/correct). Unlike Figure 3 and 4, all trials (irrespective of 
reward size condition) were included in all panels of this figure. 
(C) Average AUCs of dopamine responses to stimulus and feedback tone for 
different reward conditions. The AUC of each individual neuron at each stimulus 
coherence level was measured by comparing neuronal responses in correct and 
error trials and were then averaged across neurons. For both small and large reward 
conditions neuronal AUCs increased at the time of stimulus (left) and decreased at 
the feedback time (right), as a function of stimulus coherence. These results 
remained statistically significant even when responses of all recorded cells are taken 
into account (Linear regression of population AUCs onto stimulus coherence; 
stimulus time: P = 0.03 and P = 0.000006, reward time: P = 0.04 and P = 0.007 for 
small and large reward conditions, respectively).  
(D) Left: PSTHs of example dopamine neuron (same neuron shown in Figure 3) 
separated based on the upcoming reward size (i.e. reward size associated with the 
saccade direction, top panel) or based on the upcoming outcome (correct/error, 
bottom panel). These responses were used to measure area under ROC curve 
shown on the right. Right: scatter plot of AUCs measured for each neuron 
quantifying reward size coding and decision confidence coding for each individual 
neuron. For each neuron, the statistical significance was estimated using 
permutation test (see Experimental Procedures). Circled point indicates the example 
neuron shown on the left panels. See also Figure S5. 
 
Supplemental Information 
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures and 5 
figures. 
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Supplemental Figures 
Figure S1. Monkeys’ decisions reflect both stimulus difficulty and reward magnitude (Related to 
Figure 1). 
(A) Monkeys’ psychometric curves separated based on the response side to which the large reward 
magnitude was assigned. Animals could categorize easy random dot motion stimuli almost perfectly and 
were challenged with more difficult stimuli. Moreover, monkeys tended to respond in the direction 
associated with the large juice reward. Dots indicate data averaged across all testing sessions. Thick lines 
represent logistic fits to the data. Both animals showed significant bias towards the side with larger 
reward (p < 0.05, in both animals, permutation test). In all panels, error bars are s.e.m. across test 
sessions. 
(B) Choice reaction time. The saccadic reaction times were z-normalized and separated based on motion 
coherence (its absolute value) and saccade direction (to the side associated with large or small reward). 
Monkeys showed faster reaction times when making saccade to the side associated with the larger reward 
(compare dashed lines with solid lines). Moreover, animals’ reaction times were modulated by stimulus 
difficulty and decision outcome (i.e. correct or error) in a manner consistent with predictions of the TDRL 
model with belief state. 
Supplemental Data
 Figure S2. Schematic of the alternative model and the reduced POMDP model and additional predictions 
of the main TDRL model (Related to Figure 1). 
(A) In this model, the decision making system assign one state, ?̂?𝑚 (shown in orange), to the motion 
stimulus and makes the choice by comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚 , 𝑅) (𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴)). Since the 
dopamine system does not have direct access to the sensory evidence used for choice, it assigns another 
state, ?̂?𝑚′ (shown in purple), to the motion stimulus, which could be identical to different from the one 
used for choice,?̂?𝑚. The larger Q-value (𝑄(?̂?𝑚′, 𝐿)or𝑄(?̂?𝑚′ , 𝑅)) is used for prediction error computation. 
The dopamine prediction error patterns of this model are shown in Figure 1F-H. 
(B) Schematic of the reduced POMDP model. This model does not include a full belief state but uses the 
mean of the belief state to assign a single state ?̂?𝑚  to the motion stimulus and perform choice by 
comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅)(𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴)). The prediction error patterns are similar to those 
of our full POMDP model (see Figure 1C-E). Such a reduced model could achieve what the full POMDP 
achieves in one trial, over many of trials. 
(C) Decision accuracy of the TDRL model with full belief state as a function of decision value prediction 
errors (DPEs) at the time of stimulus. 
  
 Figure S3. Dopamine responses to the fixation cue do not predict reaction times (Related to Figure 3). 
(A) Dopamine population responses to the fixation cue. The black horizontal bar indicates the temporal 
window used for the analysis shown in (B) and (C). 
(B) Dopamine responses to the fixation cue plotted as a function of z-scored fixation reaction time. In 
each panel of the figure, the line shows single linear regression on the population responses. 
(C) Dopamine responses to the fixation spot as a function of z-scored choice reaction time.  
(D) The population dopamine responses at the time of motion stimulus measured 60-600 ms after the 
stimulus onset. 
 Figure S4. Pre-choice dopamine responses do not predict reaction times and fixation or pre-stimulus 
dopamine responses do not predict choice accuracy (Related to Figure 4). 
(A) Animals’ saccadic reaction times separated based on the pre-saccade dopamine responses (below 
and above 75th percentile, respectively).  
(B) Choice accuracy as a function of dopamine responses to the fixation cue (below and above 75th 
percentile, respectively) computed separately for the two monkeys. 
(B) Choice accuracy as a function of dopamine pre-stimulus tonic responses (below and above 75th 
percentile, respectively) computed separately for the two monkeys. 
 
 Figure S5. Prediction errors of the alternative TDRL model when all trials, regardless of reward size re 
included in the analysis (Related to Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
  
Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Temporal difference reinforcement learning models 
Here we describe the basic features of the model implementation that were common among all model 
variants. 
We simulated the sequence of behavioral events in each trial as states, 𝑠. For our task, these states are 
‘initial, ‘fixation cue’, ‘motion stimulus’, ‘feedback and ‘end’, denoted as 𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑓𝑐, 𝑠𝑚, 𝑠𝑓𝑏 , 𝑠𝑒 . In each 
state, the agent performs an action, 𝑎, observes an outcome and transits to the next state, 𝑠′. 
Apart from the ‘motion stimulus’ state, in which the agent learns which action (left or right) to take, in 
all other states the agent visits the subsequent state based on a pre-defined transition probability. This 
transition function indicates the probability that the agent visits the state 𝑠′ from its current state 𝑠, as  
𝑝𝑠𝑠′ = 𝑝{𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠′| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠}                          Eq. 1 
For instance, we set the probability of transition from the ‘fixation cue’ to the ‘motion stimulus’ to 0.99, 
meaning that in 99% of trials the agent visits ‘motion stimulus’ after the ‘fixation cue’ state. In the 
remaining 1% trials, after the ‘fixation cue’ the agent visits the ‘trial end’ state, resembling trials in which 
animals failed to fixate. These transition probabilities were set to reproduce animals’ highly stable 
success in fixating on the fixation cue (~99% of trials) and were kept constant across all trials of the 
model run. For our model illustrations in Figure 1,2, 5 and Figure S5, we only include trials in which the 
agent reached ‘motion stimulus’ state. 
The goal of the agent is to take actions that maximize the discounted cumulative reward, defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾
𝑘 ∞
𝑘=0 𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1                                                              Eq. 2  
where 𝑟𝑡 is the immediate reward the agent receives in transitioning from 𝑠𝑡−1 to 𝑠𝑡 and 𝛾 is a discount 
factor that controls the degree to which immediate rewards are preferred to rewards achieved in 
subsequent state transitions.  
When occupying state 𝑠, the state-action value, 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎), defines the expected cumulative reward when 
the agent occupies state 𝑠 and takes action 𝑎: 
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝐸[∑ 𝛾𝑘∞𝑘=0 𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1|𝑠0 = 𝑠, 𝑎0 = 𝑎]                                                         Eq. 3              
After the transition from 𝑠𝑡 to 𝑠𝑡+1, the agent makes a comparison between the prior value prediction and 
current value estimate and computes a prediction error, defined as: 
𝛿𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡+1 +  𝛾𝑄(𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝑎𝑡+1) −  𝑄(𝑠𝑡  , 𝑎𝑡)                                                                                           Eq. 4                                                                  
The agent uses the computed prediction error to update the action value estimates, using the following 
updating rule: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) + 𝛼𝛿𝑡                    Eq. 5                                                                                     
where  𝛼  is the learning rate. For our simulations we set 𝛼 = 0.01  and 𝛾 = 1  (i.e. no temporal 
discounting). 
Behavioral task 
The behavioral task has been described previously in detail [S1] and is outlined here briefly. Two male 
monkeys (Japanese macaques, weighing 7-9.5 kg) were rewarded in each trial for correct discrimination 
of the motion direction of a random dot motion stimulus. We used a set of random dot motion stimuli 
with two directions (right and left), and four coherence levels (0, 10, 25, and 50% for monkey L; 0, 2.5, 
10, and 50% for monkey K). A trial started with the appearance of a fixation cue at the center of the 
monitor, followed by a dynamic random dot motion stimulus and two peripheral targets, after which the 
monkey were free to make a saccade to one of two targets to indicate its choice. The random dot motion 
stimulus disappeared as soon as the monkey made an eye movement. Monkeys kept their gaze on the 
chosen target for 0.5 s and then received different auditory feedbacks for correct and error choices. If the 
monkey chose correctly, a high pitch feedback tone (1000 Hz, 0.2 s) was delivered, followed by a juice 
reward immediately after the tone offset. When the choice was incorrect, only a low pitch feedback tone 
(400 Hz, 0.2 s) was delivered, with an additional 5 s timeout as a penalty. Error trials were repeated to 
the animal and monkeys had near perfect performance in these repeat trials. Thus, it is more accurate to 
describe error trials as having delayed reward, rather than no reward. At the zero coherence level, motion 
direction was randomly assigned as either “rightward” in half of the trials or “leftward” in the other half. 
In each block of 126-168 trials, one direction of motion was associated with a large reward (0.38 ml), 
and the other was associated with a small reward (0.16 ml). The direction-reward contingency was fixed 
throughout a given block and reversed in the subsequent block. Animals could categorize easy (high 
motion coherence) stimuli almost perfectly but were challenged by more difficult stimuli (low motion 
coherence) and showed bias toward the direction associated with the large reward (Figure S1). 
Analysis of the behavioral data 
The behavioral data have been described in detail previously [S1]. We fitted the choice data to a logistic 
function (Figure S1A). For the analysis of choice reaction time (the interval between the onset of the 
random dot motion stimulus and the time that animal’s saccade landed on one of the target) and fixation 
reaction time (the interval between the onset of the fixation cue and the time that animal’s saccade landed 
on it), we normalized each trial’s reaction time by computing session-by-session z-scored reaction times 
(Figure S1B and Figure S3B and C).  
Localization and recording of dopamine neurons 
Dopamine neuronal recording has been described in details previously [S1] and will be described here 
briefly. We estimated the location of the substantia nigra by proton density-enhanced magnetic resonance 
(MR) images. We placed a round recording chamber (Crist Instrument) on the skull with dental cement 
so that the center of the recording chamber targeted the substantia nigra pars compacta. Recordings were 
made using an epoxy-coated tungsten electrode (shank diameter, 0.25 mm, 0.5–1.5 M measured at 
1000 Hz (FHC). Dopamine neurons were identified according to their low tonic irregular spontaneous 
firing rates (<10 Hz), relatively long duration of action potentials (>1.5 ms), and transient responses to 
unexpected reward delivery.  
Analysis of the neuronal data 
The temporal windows used for the analysis of the neuronal data are shown in Figure 3, 4 and Figure S3 
(post fixation cue: 80-280 ms, pre random dot motion stimulus (for tonic dopamine response): -500−0 
ms, post random dot motion stimulus: 220−500ms, pre saccade: -300−0 ms, post feedback tone: 80−330 
ms). Because dopamine neurons showed qualitatively similar responses in the present study, the time 
windows specified above were applied to all recorded neurons (apart from minimal modifications on the 
analysis time window used for illustrated example neurons, as shown with gray horizontal bars in Figure 
3 and 4). We used raw neuronal firing rates for all our analysis, apart from the analysis shown in Figure 
3D and 5B in which we z-scored normalized the activity of each neuron. 
To quantify the time course of dopamine responses in the correct and error trials, we used sliding window 
receiver operating curve (ROC) analyses (sliding window of 250 ms shifted in 10 ms steps) aligned to 
different task events. We used the area under constructed ROC curve (AUC) as the index indicating 
differential neuronal activity in correct and error trails (AUCs close to 1 indicate larger dopamine 
responses in the correct trial compared to the error trials and AUCs close to 0 correspond to smaller 
neuronal responses in the correct trials compared to the error trials). To assess the statistical significance 
of computed AUCs, we used a permutation test (with 200,000 resamples) and determined the first 
instance that the AUC reached statistical significance during each trial by finding the time epoch that the 
permutation test indicated statistical significance (P < 0.001) in three consecutive time steps. We also 
used AUC measures to quantify neuronal response difference in a fixed time window after task events 
(as defined above) in correct/error trials as well as small/large reward trials (Figure 5C and D) and 
examined their statistical significance using permutation test, P < 0.01.  
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Supplemental Figures 
Figure S1. Monkeys’ decisions reflect both stimulus difficulty and reward magnitude (Related to 
Figure 1). 
(A) Monkeys’ psychometric curves separated based on the response side to which the large reward 
magnitude was assigned. Animals could categorize easy random dot motion stimuli almost perfectly and 
were challenged with more difficult stimuli. Moreover, monkeys tended to respond in the direction 
associated with the large juice reward. Dots indicate data averaged across all testing sessions. Thick lines 
represent logistic fits to the data. Both animals showed significant bias towards the side with larger 
reward (p < 0.05, in both animals, permutation test). In all panels, error bars are s.e.m. across test 
sessions. 
(B) Choice reaction time. The saccadic reaction times were z-normalized and separated based on motion 
coherence (its absolute value) and saccade direction (to the side associated with large or small reward). 
Monkeys showed faster reaction times when making saccade to the side associated with the larger reward 
(compare dashed lines with solid lines). Moreover, animals’ reaction times were modulated by stimulus 
difficulty and decision outcome (i.e. correct or error) in a manner consistent with predictions of the TDRL 
model with belief state. 
Supplemental Data Word file
 Figure S2. Schematic of the alternative model and the reduced POMDP model and additional predictions 
of the main TDRL model (Related to Figure 1). 
(A) In this model, the decision making system assign one state, ?̂?𝑚 (shown in orange), to the motion 
stimulus and makes the choice by comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚 , 𝑅) (𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴)). Since the 
dopamine system does not have direct access to the sensory evidence used for choice, it assigns another 
state, ?̂?𝑚′ (shown in purple), to the motion stimulus, which could be identical to different from the one 
used for choice,?̂?𝑚. The larger Q-value (𝑄(?̂?𝑚′, 𝐿)or𝑄(?̂?𝑚′ , 𝑅)) is used for prediction error computation. 
The dopamine prediction error patterns of this model are shown in Figure 1F-H. 
(B) Schematic of the reduced POMDP model. This model does not include a full belief state but uses the 
mean of the belief state to assign a single state ?̂?𝑚  to the motion stimulus and perform choice by 
comparing 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝐿) and 𝑄(?̂?𝑚, 𝑅)(𝑎 = argmax
𝐴
𝑄(𝐴)). The prediction error patterns are similar to those 
of our full POMDP model (see Figure 1C-E). Such a reduced model could achieve what the full POMDP 
achieves in one trial, over many of trials. 
(C) Decision accuracy of the TDRL model with full belief state as a function of decision value prediction 
errors (DPEs) at the time of stimulus. 
  
 Figure S3. Dopamine responses to the fixation cue do not predict reaction times (Related to Figure 3). 
(A) Dopamine population responses to the fixation cue. The black horizontal bar indicates the temporal 
window used for the analysis shown in (B) and (C). 
(B) Dopamine responses to the fixation cue plotted as a function of z-scored fixation reaction time. In 
each panel of the figure, the line shows single linear regression on the population responses. 
(C) Dopamine responses to the fixation spot as a function of z-scored choice reaction time.  
(D) The population dopamine responses at the time of motion stimulus measured 60-600 ms after the 
stimulus onset. 
 Figure S4. Pre-choice dopamine responses do not predict reaction times and fixation or pre-stimulus 
dopamine responses do not predict choice accuracy (Related to Figure 4). 
(A) Animals’ saccadic reaction times separated based on the pre-saccade dopamine responses (below 
and above 75th percentile, respectively).  
(B) Choice accuracy as a function of dopamine responses to the fixation cue (below and above 75th 
percentile, respectively) computed separately for the two monkeys. 
(B) Choice accuracy as a function of dopamine pre-stimulus tonic responses (below and above 75th 
percentile, respectively) computed separately for the two monkeys. 
 
 Figure S5. Prediction errors of the alternative TDRL model when all trials, regardless of reward size re 
included in the analysis (Related to Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
  
Supplemental Experimental Procedures 
Temporal difference reinforcement learning models 
Here we describe the basic features of the model implementation that were common among all model 
variants. 
We simulated the sequence of behavioral events in each trial as states, 𝑠. For our task, these states are 
‘initial, ‘fixation cue’, ‘motion stimulus’, ‘feedback and ‘end’, denoted as 𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑓𝑐, 𝑠𝑚, 𝑠𝑓𝑏 , 𝑠𝑒 . In each 
state, the agent performs an action, 𝑎, observes an outcome and transits to the next state, 𝑠′. 
Apart from the ‘motion stimulus’ state, in which the agent learns which action (left or right) to take, in 
all other states the agent visits the subsequent state based on a pre-defined transition probability. This 
transition function indicates the probability that the agent visits the state 𝑠′ from its current state 𝑠, as  
𝑝𝑠𝑠′ = 𝑝{𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠′| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠}                          Eq. 1 
For instance, we set the probability of transition from the ‘fixation cue’ to the ‘motion stimulus’ to 0.99, 
meaning that in 99% of trials the agent visits ‘motion stimulus’ after the ‘fixation cue’ state. In the 
remaining 1% trials, after the ‘fixation cue’ the agent visits the ‘trial end’ state, resembling trials in which 
animals failed to fixate. These transition probabilities were set to reproduce animals’ highly stable 
success in fixating on the fixation cue (~99% of trials) and were kept constant across all trials of the 
model run. For our model illustrations in Figure 1,2, 5 and Figure S5, we only include trials in which the 
agent reached ‘motion stimulus’ state. 
The goal of the agent is to take actions that maximize the discounted cumulative reward, defined as: 
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾
𝑘 ∞
𝑘=0 𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1                                                              Eq. 2  
where 𝑟𝑡 is the immediate reward the agent receives in transitioning from 𝑠𝑡−1 to 𝑠𝑡 and 𝛾 is a discount 
factor that controls the degree to which immediate rewards are preferred to rewards achieved in 
subsequent state transitions.  
When occupying state 𝑠, the state-action value, 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎), defines the expected cumulative reward when 
the agent occupies state 𝑠 and takes action 𝑎: 
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝐸[∑ 𝛾𝑘∞𝑘=0 𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1|𝑠0 = 𝑠, 𝑎0 = 𝑎]                                                         Eq. 3              
After the transition from 𝑠𝑡 to 𝑠𝑡+1, the agent makes a comparison between the prior value prediction and 
current value estimate and computes a prediction error, defined as: 
𝛿𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡+1 +  𝛾𝑄(𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝑎𝑡+1) −  𝑄(𝑠𝑡  , 𝑎𝑡)                                                                                           Eq. 4                                                                  
The agent uses the computed prediction error to update the action value estimates, using the following 
updating rule: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) + 𝛼𝛿𝑡                    Eq. 5                                                                                     
where  𝛼  is the learning rate. For our simulations we set 𝛼 = 0.01  and 𝛾 = 1  (i.e. no temporal 
discounting). 
Behavioral task 
The behavioral task has been described previously in detail [S1] and is outlined here briefly. Two male 
monkeys (Japanese macaques, weighing 7-9.5 kg) were rewarded in each trial for correct discrimination 
of the motion direction of a random dot motion stimulus. We used a set of random dot motion stimuli 
with two directions (right and left), and four coherence levels (0, 10, 25, and 50% for monkey L; 0, 2.5, 
10, and 50% for monkey K). A trial started with the appearance of a fixation cue at the center of the 
monitor, followed by a dynamic random dot motion stimulus and two peripheral targets, after which the 
monkey were free to make a saccade to one of two targets to indicate its choice. The random dot motion 
stimulus disappeared as soon as the monkey made an eye movement. Monkeys kept their gaze on the 
chosen target for 0.5 s and then received different auditory feedbacks for correct and error choices. If the 
monkey chose correctly, a high pitch feedback tone (1000 Hz, 0.2 s) was delivered, followed by a juice 
reward immediately after the tone offset. When the choice was incorrect, only a low pitch feedback tone 
(400 Hz, 0.2 s) was delivered, with an additional 5 s timeout as a penalty. Error trials were repeated to 
the animal and monkeys had near perfect performance in these repeat trials. Thus, it is more accurate to 
describe error trials as having delayed reward, rather than no reward. At the zero coherence level, motion 
direction was randomly assigned as either “rightward” in half of the trials or “leftward” in the other half. 
In each block of 126-168 trials, one direction of motion was associated with a large reward (0.38 ml), 
and the other was associated with a small reward (0.16 ml). The direction-reward contingency was fixed 
throughout a given block and reversed in the subsequent block. Animals could categorize easy (high 
motion coherence) stimuli almost perfectly but were challenged by more difficult stimuli (low motion 
coherence) and showed bias toward the direction associated with the large reward (Figure S1). 
Analysis of the behavioral data 
The behavioral data have been described in detail previously [S1]. We fitted the choice data to a logistic 
function (Figure S1A). For the analysis of choice reaction time (the interval between the onset of the 
random dot motion stimulus and the time that animal’s saccade landed on one of the target) and fixation 
reaction time (the interval between the onset of the fixation cue and the time that animal’s saccade landed 
on it), we normalized each trial’s reaction time by computing session-by-session z-scored reaction times 
(Figure S1B and Figure S3B and C).  
Localization and recording of dopamine neurons 
Dopamine neuronal recording has been described in details previously [S1] and will be described here 
briefly. We estimated the location of the substantia nigra by proton density-enhanced magnetic resonance 
(MR) images. We placed a round recording chamber (Crist Instrument) on the skull with dental cement 
so that the center of the recording chamber targeted the substantia nigra pars compacta. Recordings were 
made using an epoxy-coated tungsten electrode (shank diameter, 0.25 mm, 0.5–1.5 M measured at 
1000 Hz (FHC). Dopamine neurons were identified according to their low tonic irregular spontaneous 
firing rates (<10 Hz), relatively long duration of action potentials (>1.5 ms), and transient responses to 
unexpected reward delivery.  
Analysis of the neuronal data 
The temporal windows used for the analysis of the neuronal data are shown in Figure 3, 4 and Figure S3 
(post fixation cue: 80-280 ms, pre random dot motion stimulus (for tonic dopamine response): -500−0 
ms, post random dot motion stimulus: 220−500ms, pre saccade: -300−0 ms, post feedback tone: 80−330 
ms). Because dopamine neurons showed qualitatively similar responses in the present study, the time 
windows specified above were applied to all recorded neurons (apart from minimal modifications on the 
analysis time window used for illustrated example neurons, as shown with gray horizontal bars in Figure 
3 and 4). We used raw neuronal firing rates for all our analysis, apart from the analysis shown in Figure 
3D and 5B in which we z-scored normalized the activity of each neuron. 
To quantify the time course of dopamine responses in the correct and error trials, we used sliding window 
receiver operating curve (ROC) analyses (sliding window of 250 ms shifted in 10 ms steps) aligned to 
different task events. We used the area under constructed ROC curve (AUC) as the index indicating 
differential neuronal activity in correct and error trails (AUCs close to 1 indicate larger dopamine 
responses in the correct trial compared to the error trials and AUCs close to 0 correspond to smaller 
neuronal responses in the correct trials compared to the error trials). To assess the statistical significance 
of computed AUCs, we used a permutation test (with 200,000 resamples) and determined the first 
instance that the AUC reached statistical significance during each trial by finding the time epoch that the 
permutation test indicated statistical significance (P < 0.001) in three consecutive time steps. We also 
used AUC measures to quantify neuronal response difference in a fixed time window after task events 
(as defined above) in correct/error trials as well as small/large reward trials (Figure 5C and D) and 
examined their statistical significance using permutation test, P < 0.01.  
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